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Abstract. The results of Fuzzy Fault Tree (FFT) analyses of various accidental scenarios, which involve the 
operators in potential exposures inside an High Dose Rate (HDR) remote after-loading systems for use in 
brachytherapy, are reported. To carry out fault tree analyses by means of fuzzy probabilities, the TREEZZY2 
computer code is used. Moreover, the HEART (Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique) model, 
properly modified on the basis of the fuzzy approach, has been employed to assess the impact of performance-
shaping and error-promoting factors in the context of the accidental events. The assessment of potential dose 
values for some identified accidental scenarios allows to consider, for a particular event, a fuzzy uncertainty 
range in potential dose estimate. The availability of lower and upper limits allows evaluating the possibility of 
optimization of the installation from the point of view of radiation protection. The adequacy of the training and 
information program for staff and patients (and their family members) and the effectiveness of behavioural rules 
and safety procedures were tested. Some recommendations on procedures and equipment to reduce the risk of 
radiological exposure are also provided. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) has issued many reports providing 
advice on radiological protection and safety in irradiation plants employed, for example, in industrial 
and agricultural applications, radiotherapy, and particle physics research [1-4].  
Even though great care is given in planning safety systems to prevent the potential radiological 
exposure accidents, its effectiveness is conditional upon the work performance of the operator, which 
may act making mistakes during a well-designed task sequence. This is also confirmed by experience 
which has shown, up till now, that the human factor results one of the most important causes of 
accidental events in hazard industrial plants and that the underlying reasons of such events are very 
complex because of their difficult interpretation. Unfortunately, the human errors are also among the 
most difficult to quantify, because they are strongly dependent on the circumstances and on the so-
called performance shaping factors (layout of the workplace, amount of noise and distraction, level of 
stress, and so on).  
The lack of accurate quantitative human reliability data is to be seen as a serious limitation and a 
major source of uncertainty in the risk assessment. So, in the last years, various Authors have 
suggested to resort to fuzzy sets models which, indeed, prove to be well suited when uncertainty is 
present and little is known about it [5-8]. 
To further deepen studies relevant the risk in the above mentioned industrial fields, at the same time 
dealing with the uncertainties related to human errors, we carried out analyses by using Fuzzy Fault 
Tree (FFT) techniques. In particular, we are interested to the hypothesised accidental events which 
lead to the potential radiological exposure of the medical team operating in a center equipped with 
High Dose Rate (HDR) remote after-loading system for use in brachytherapy.  
To evaluate the probabilities of the accidental events related to human error, it seemed appropriate to 
us to take into account the impact of situational characteristics and error-promoting factors, and to 
employ all these in the HEART (Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique) methodology 
[9], a first generation HRA (Human Reliability Analysis) method, modified by us on the basis of fuzzy 
sets concept [10]. 
The analyses have been carried out by using a computer program named TREEZZY2 (TREE fuZZY) 
[11, 12] developed at the Department of Nuclear Engineering, of Palermo University. The code allows 
the use of fuzzy or classic methodologies in Fault Trees (FT) and Event Trees (ET) reliability analyses 
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and to deepen the analyses by determining the tree’s minimal cut sets and the importance indexes for 
the basic events. 
As shown in the following, these studies have also allowed to provide procedural recommendations 
and suggestions on additional safety equipments to reduce the risk of radiological exposure. 
 
2. Uncertainty analysis by fuzzy probabilities 
 
The failure probabilities for components or systems can be affected with some uncertainties, either 
because of insufficient amount of available data or related to their imprecision as regards those 
connected with human errors. For this reason, the evaluation of the uncertainty affecting the overall 
system failure probability is, in many cases, mandatory, and entails complicated calculations to 
propagate the uncertainties up to the final probability. 
The difficulties concerning insufficient amount of failure data, uncertainties, complexity of the 
propagation calculations, have been recently get over by resorting to the Fuzzy Set Theory (FST).  
The Fuzzy logic model was introduced by Zadeh [10], to deal with the problem in which the 
phenomena are imprecise and vague. As it is known, the traditional set theory is based on a bivalent 
logic where a number or object is either a member of a set or it is not. Contrary to that, let X be a 
collection of number or objects (fuzzy set), called the universe, whose elements are denoted by x, a 
fuzzy subset A in X is characterized by a membership function µA(X) which associates a real number 
in the interval [0, 1] with each element x in X. The function value µA(X) represents the degree of 
membership of x in the fuzzy set A.  
A membership function for a fuzzy set is usually assumed to be a triangular or trapezoidal function 
(see Fig. 1), even if other shapes are used too. 
 
Figure 1: Membership functions of triangular (a) and trapezoidal (b) fuzzy sets. 
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function µA:R→ [0, 1] is: 
( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ≤≤−
−≤≤−
−= otherwise 0;for  ;for  32
32
3
21
12
1 xxx
xx
xxxxx
xx
xxxAµ    (1) 
 
with x1 < x2 < x3. The triangular fuzzy number can be denoted by A = [x1 ; x2 ; x3] where x2 gives the 
maximum grade of µA(x), i.e. µA(x2) = 1, the most probable value of the evaluation data, whereas x1 
and x3 are the lower and the upper bound of the variable area for the evaluation data. 
Further, a fuzzy number is trapezoidal fuzzy number if its membership function µA:R→ [0, 1] is: 
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with x1 < x2 < x3 < x4. The trapezoidal fuzzy number can be denoted by A = [x1; x2; x3; x4]. The 
interval [x2; x3] are the most likely values of µA(x), x1 and x4 are the lower and the upper bound of the 
variable area for the evaluation data. 
These two kinds of fuzzy numbers are used because these specific membership functions are 
intuitively easy for evaluation, under some weak assumptions [13]. 
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3. Fuzzy approach to HEART 
 
The HEART technique, derived from a wide range of findings in the ergonomics literature, assumes 
that any predicted reliability of task performance may be modified according to the presence and 
strength of the identified Error Promoting Conditions (EPCs). The method identifies nine generic task 
types and proposes nominal human unreliability values and their suggested bounding values, together 
with seventeen EPCs whose influence on performance task is considered of maximum effect [9].  
In the HEART methodology the failure rate is estimated by using the following empirical expression: 
 
( )[ ]⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ +−= ∏
i
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where P is the probability of human error, P0 is the nominal human unreliability, EPCi is the i-th Error-
Promoting Condition and Api is the engineer’s assessment of the proportion effect (from 0 to 1) for 
each i-th EPC, so called proportion assessment factor. As above said, the method provides a very 
useful list of nominal human unreliability and error-promoting conditions, with suggested values for 
each P0 (Table 1) and EPCi (Table 2). 
 
Table 1: Value of the probability of human error, P0. 
 
 Generic task P0
A Totally unfamiliar, performed at speed with no real idea of likely consequences 0.55
B Shift/restore system to new /original state on a single attempt without supervisor procedure  0.26
C Complex task requiring high level of comprehension and skill 0.16
D Fairly simple task performed rapidly or given scant attention 0.09
E Routine highly practised rapid task involving relatively low level of skill 0.02
F Restore or shift system to original or new state following procedures + checking 0.003
G Completely familiar, well-designed highly practised, routine task occurring several times per 
hour, performed to the highest possible standards by highly motivated, highly trained and 
experienced person, totally aware of implications of failure with time to correct potential 
error but without the benefit of significant job aids 
0.0004 
H Respond correctly to system command even when there is an augmented or automated 
supervisory system providing accurate interpretation of system state 
0.000002
M Miscellaneous task for which no description can be found 0.03
 
Table 2: Value of the error-promoting condition EPC. 
 
 Error-promoting condition EPC value
1 Unfamiliarity with novel or infrequent situation which is potentially important 17 
2 Shortage of time for error detection or correction 11 
3 Noisy/confused signals 10 
4 A means of suppressing or overriding information 9 
5 No means of conveying spatial or functional information to human operator 9 
6 Poor system/human user interface 8 
7 No obvious means of reversing an unintended action 8 
8 Information overload 6 
9 Technique unlearning/one which requires application of opposing philosophy 6 
10 Transfer knowledge from one task to another 5 
11 Ambiguity in required performance standard 5 
12 Mismatch between perceived and actual risk 4 
13 Poor, ambiguous or ill-matched feed- back 4 
14 No clear/direct/timely confirmation of intended action from system 4 
15 Inexperience (newly qualified but not an expert) 3 
16 Poor instructions or procedures 3 
17 Little or no independent checking or testing of output 3 
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The use of HEART technique is favourable for its simplicity and easy application, but presents several 
problems. For example, the EPCs are not independent of each other and the use of the method is 
extremely subjective and heavily relied on the experience of the analyst. Moreover, they are an useful 
list of factors to qualitative guide safety managers, however the numerical values are context-sensitive 
and the predictive equation is empirical. 
In order to take into consideration the above mentioned weaknesses, in this paper it is proposed to 
modify such technique by using the concept of the fuzzy linguistic expressions in the representation of 
the proportion assessment factors, Api. This approach to define the Api factor has been made because 
in the HEART model, among others, this parameter is the one mostly characterized by subjective and 
imprecise connotations. 
As it is known, the concept of the linguistic variable, defined as a variable the values of which are 
words, phrases, or sentences in a natural or artificial language, is very useful when ones deals with 
situations too complex or too ill-defined to be reasonably described in conventional quantitative 
expressions. These Linguistic Values (LV) can be represented by the approximate reasoning of fuzzy 
number. For example, for Very Low (VL), Low (L), Medium (M), High (H), Very High (VH) the 
fuzzy number of these linguistic values can be described as in Fig. 2, whereas the relevant membership 
functions can be represented as Eq.s 4 trough 8. 
 
Figure  2: Fuzzy linguistic variables representation. 
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The linguistic variables so represented can be suitable employed to estimate the Api in Eq. (3), which 
can be expressed as: 
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where APLV is for each ith EPC the triangular membership function variable represented by Eqs. 4 
through 8.  In the reported fuzzy fault tree analyses we have evaluated the fuzzy probabilities of basic 
events related to human error by using the HEART methodology modified as above said.  
 
4. FFT analyses of the medical operator potential exposure in HDR brachytherapy 
 
HDR brachytherapy is an advanced cancer treatment which involves remote-controlled after-loading 
of a high-activity sealed source (usually, 192Ir) directly within the tumour of the patient. Over the last 
few years, HDR brachytherapy is a rapidly growing technique that has been replacing Low Dose Rate 
(LDR) procedures which often requires that the patients remain as still as possible for days at a time.  
The remote-controlled after-loading eliminates the hazards of radiological exposure, allowing 
complete radiation protection for all hospital staﬀ, regardless of whether LDR or HDR brachytherapy 
is used. However the use of HDR brachytherapy has the advantage that the treatments can be 
performed, as above said, in just a few minutes and to reduce the radiation exposure in the surrounding 
healthy tissues. An adequately shielded room, (Treatment Room, TR) for the remote afterloading 
device, a necessary imaging equipment, and a separate room for the operators (Control Room, CR) are 
required to avoid direct exposure of the operators. This allows all components of the treatment to take 
place without moving the patient. 
The afterloader system here examined consists of a motor-driven source transport system for 
automatically transferring 192Ir source between a shielded source container and the treatment 
applicator. Parts of the system are:  a Stepping Motor (SM) to move the source; a backup battery and 
Direct Current (DC) safety motor to withdraw the source into the safe; a control device to check if the 
backup battery is charged; a source transferring and positioning system; several channels for source 
transport and a built-in Geiger-Muller counter inside the HDR to check that the source has returned to 
the safe[14]. 
The control console, located inside the CR, operates the afterloader, shows the source position on the 
display as the treatment progresses, and prints out a report of the treatment. The monitoring of ambient 
dose level of the TR by using gamma detector, and the warning lights and acoustic alarms are also an 
integral part of safety devices. Tree emergency stop push-buttons located, respectively, on the HDR 
unit, inside TR and on the control console inside the CR allow to interrupt the procedure in any time. 
When the treatment is in progress, an electrical switch detects if the TR door is closed. If the operator 
erroneously opens the door during the treatment, the irradiation process is interrupted by the DC safety 
motor which withdraws the source into the safe. 
 
4.1 Description of the accidental scenario analysed by using FFT 
 
The hypothesized accidental scenarios which lead to the potential exposure of the medical team 
during an HDR treatment procedure, are schematized by the following main circumstances:  
A. The operator, erroneously, tries to enter the treatment room when the irradiation is in progress. 
The failures of the following safety systems also occur: gamma detector, DC safety motor; 
electrical switch; warning lights and acoustic alarms. For these last systems, it is also 
considered that the signals can be ignored by the operator.  
B. The operator goes into the treatment room to manually withdraw the source into the shielded 
container when the electrical blackout occurs and the source safety transferring systems (DC 
motor and backup battery) fail. 
C. At the end of the treatment process, the operator must go into the treatment room to manually 
withdraw the source into the shielded container because the following components failure 
occurs: stepper motor; DC motor; all tree of the emergency stop push-buttons. 
D. The operator begins the irradiation and fails to notice that another operator is in the treatment 
room. This can occur if the operator is distracted and doesn’t perform the visual inspection by 
television camera located inside the control room. The failure of the emergency stop push-
button in the treatment room also occurs.  
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The above depicted scenarios are resumed in the fault trees reported in Figs. 3 through 7. The 
failure data used for the analysis are shown in Tables 3 and 4 as fuzzy probability. 
 
Figure  3: Level of the fault tree. 
 
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
                      
 
We point out that the method described in a previous section has been adopted for fuzzy probability 
evaluation of the components and safety system, whereas the human error probability have been 
evaluated taking into account that the operating medical team is trained in operating practices.  
The analysis carried out with the TREEZZY code, shows for the operator exposure the Top Event 
(TE) fuzzy probability: 
 
                     P(TE) = [x1, x2, x3] = [1.9 10-5; 2.56 10-5; 3.32 10-5] /year.   (10) 
 
Figure 5: Electrical blackout Sub - fault 
tree. 
Figure 6: Failure of the source transferring 
system at the end of the treatment process 
sub-fault tree.
Figure 7: Operator fails to notice another 
operator in TR sub-fault tree. 
Figure  4: Operator tries to enter in TR when 
the irradiation is in progress subfault tree. 
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In Figs. 8 and 9 the obtained results in terms of the fuzzy FIM (Fuzzy Importance Measure) and FUIM 
(Fuzzy Uncertainty Importance Measure) indexes exhibiting the higher values are also reported.  
 
Table 3:  Occurrence Probability relevant to technical faults. 
 
Event Number Fuzzy Probability 
 x1 x2 x3
Event 4 - Acoustic alarm failure 4.58E-03 5.30E-03 6.02E-03
Event 5 -  Warning lights alarm failure 7.18E-03 8.30E-03 9.42E-03
Event 6 - Electrical switch failure 2.42E-03 2.80E-03 3.18E-03
Event 7, 12 and 16 - DC motor failure 6.30E-03 7.28E-03 8.26E-03
Event 8 - Backup battery failure 8.65E-02 1.00E-01 1.14E-01
Event 9 - Backup battery charged control system failure 6.06E-04 7.00E-04 7.95E-04
Event 10 - Electrical blackout 1.30E-03 1.50E-03 1.70E-03
Event 13 - Gamma detector failure 3.63E-03 4.20E-03 4.77E-03
Events 14 - SM failure 1.73E-03 2.00E-03 2.27E-03
Event 15 and 18 Emergency stop push-button located on the HDR unit failure 8.65E-04 1.00E-03 1.14E-03
Events 17- Emergency stop push-button located on the control console failure 8.65E-04 1.00E-03 1.14E-03
Event 19 - Emergency stop push-button located in the TR failure 8.65E-04 1.00E-03 1.14E-03
Event 24 - Television camera failure 2.91E-03 3.36E-03 3.81E-03
 
Table 4 :  Occurrence Probability relevant to human errors. 
 
vent Number Fuzzy Probability 
 x1 x2 x3
Event 1- Operator erroneously tries to enter in TR 6.08E-03 9.50E-03 1.36E-02
Events 2 and 3- Warning light and acoustic alarm systems ignored 1.52E-02 4.36E-02 8.95E-02
Event 11 - Backup battery not charged  
                 (the operator does not remember to charge the backup battery) 4.56E-03 1.06E-02 2.03E-02 
Event 20 - Operator starts the irradiation 6.08E-03 9.50E-03 1.36E-02
Event 21- Operator fails to notice that the acoustic alarm  
                  systems is in operation 4.56E-03 1.04E-02 1.98E-02 
Event 22 - Operator fails to notice that another operator is in the TR 4.56E-03 1.04E-02 1.98E-02
Event 23 - Operator doesn’t perform the TR visual inspection 6.08E-03 1.61E-02 3.49E-02
 
Figure  8: FIM and FUIM indexes.  
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Figure 9: FIM and FUIM indexes. 
 
 
 
 
As it can see in Fig. 8, the more critical events are in correspondence of the accidental 
circumstances connected to the electrical blackout and the failure of the source safety transferring 
systems in safe container. It is to be noted that an important contribution to the uncertainty in the TE 
failure probability is related to the SM and DC motors.  For the events connected to human error, high 
FIM and FUIM values are obtained for the operator which fails to notice that another operator is in TR 
and begins the irradiation procedure, and, the operator in the TR which disregards the acoustic alarm. 
On the basis of these results, to reduce the risk of radiological potential exposure, besides what was 
provided with the plant (switches, push-buttons, dose alarms and so on), some recommendations on 
safety equipments and procedures can be adopted. For example, it can to think add in the HDR unit a 
passive safety system to allow the fast return of the source in safe container (however, with loss  of 
device compactness), whereas to avoid the presence of an operator inside the TR when the irradiation 
process starts, it can also plan a procedure based on the acoustic and/or  visual inspection of TR (for 
example with a motion detector camera). Moreover, periodic maintenance of the backup battery can 
prevent nearly all component faults. 
 
 
4.2. Fuzzy potential dose evaluation  
 
For some of the accidental scenarios characterised by higher probabilities, the fuzzy potential dose 
was evaluated.  In particular, the more critical accidental event involves emergency entry of the 
operator into the TR, at the end of the treatment process, to manually withdraw the source into the 
shielded container (GATE3 in Fig. 3). The fuzzy probability for this event is: 
 
P (GATE3 )= [1.2* 10-5; 1.46 *10-5; 1.87 *10-5] /year              (11) 
 
It was hypothesized a model which foresees for an operator the following procedures: 
- entry in the TR, drawing near the patient and source removing from the anatomic district; 
- going out with the patient out of the TR, in security. 
whereas, for the second operator (physicist) it was supposed: 
- entry in the TR, after the going out of the patient and source manual recovering by a crank. 
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Since during the movement described above, the operator moves towards the source still into the 
treatment site, the relation between the dose rate and the distance, supposed variable with the operator 
moving velocity, was arranged on the hypothesis of point-like source as 
 
)( 22 xhv
A
dx
dD
+×
×Γ=       (12) 
 
where Γ is the Specific Gamma Constant , v is velocity of operator, x the distance of the source at 
the time t, h the source height with reference to a landmark (gonads, if not else).  
The solution of (12), with v and h no zero, with the operator moving between an initial position (xinitial) 
and a final one (xfinal), results:  
 
1 ( )final initialx xD A arctg arctg
h v h h
= Γ × × × −×                (13) 
 
For the dose evaluation it was assumed the maximum value of 450 GBq (12 Ci) for source activity 
[14], a value  Γ of 1.599×10-4 mSv h-1 per MBq at 1 meter [15], while between patient and control 
room a distance of about 5 m, for h  a distance of 10 cm. For the velocity parameter, the following 
values have been assumed: 
• For radiotherapist, a drawing near velocity of 1 m/s; 
• For radiotherapist and the patient going out of the TR, a velocity of 0.5 m/s; 
• For physicist/second operator a drawing near velocity of 1 m/s. 
For the intervals of permanence near the source, ∆t between 30 and 90 s have been cautelatively 
assumed. As regards the distance r of the first operator near the patient from the source, values 
between 30 cm and 90 cm have been assumed. For second operator, who have the possibility to 
operate more distant from the source (with suitable telemanipulators), a distance between 50 and 90 
cm has been hypothesized. As these parameters can be expressed only by numerical intervals, it was 
believed right to attribute triangular fuzzy membership function to these, such as: 
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30 90 90per 30 60 s per 90 60  per 90 70  
60 30 60 90 70 90
90 30 30 s    ' per 60 30    '' per 70 50  per 60 9060 90 60 30 70 50
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⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
  
Finally, the times for radiotherapist together with the patient to way out of the TR were supposed 
non higher than 20 s. On the basis of these hypotheses, taking into consideration patient attenuation 
that, in accordance with that reported in [16] has to result equal to 2÷2.5, the fuzzy dose for every 
single event results  
D Radiotherapist = [ 0.8; 2.1; 10.4]   mSv/event 
D physicist/second operator = [ 1; 2.6; 7.3]     mSv/event  
 
included the bringing near the source and the going away with patient phases or the source moving 
towards the HDR device one, that however don’t contribute in significant way. 
As one sees, especially in case of radiotherapist, the range of effective dose interval brings to suggest 
to responsible of such kind of plants the opportunity to set out  intervention procedures that could 
allow remote and as fast as possible operations, that is quick, effective, easily acquirable by operators. 
The need to act quickly lies in the contemporary potential dose value to the patient that, for ∆t between 
30 and 90 s ranges between 40 and  120 mSv (effective dose equivalent), considering that a 192Ir 
source with an activity of 450 GBq stays in the coronary artery [17]. An increase in processing time of 
90s (1.5 min) is, for some therapeutic applications, nearly doubling the therapy time. 
Taking into account the maximum values of effective dose for radiotherapist and probabilities 
reported in (10), the following very small values for the risk R results: 
 
R = [9.6E-9; 3.1E-8; 1.95E-7] mSv /year. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Irradiation plants are more and more used in a wide spectrum of applications. In this field, as a 
potential exposure could cause severe injuries or even be lethal for the patient. Many studies are been 
carried out about this issue, resulting that the human error is one of the most important causes of 
exposition. 
Taking into account that the lack of accurate quantitative human reliability data is a serious limitation 
and a source of uncertainty in risk assessments, in this paper we try to deal with the uncertainties 
related to the human error using a fuzzy based methodology. As expected, the obtained results suggest 
that the events related human error are very significant and important in the hypothesized accidental 
scenarios, moreover the uncertainty related to them is the greatest cause of uncertainty in the whole 
analysis. The dose per event values may be high unless the security procedures osservance and stretch 
the operative timing. While safety devices of the system and the entire plant result in very small risk 
values, potential dose could be reduced by ensuring timely intervention of operators, with procedures 
tested and treated during regular exercises. 
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